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SKILLS, POLICY, AND LABOR-MARKET OUTCOMES ACROSS
DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS†

Does Monetary Policy Affect Relative Educational
Unemployment Rates?
By PHILIP N. JEFFERSON*
To some extent, the lingering pattern of
unemployment after growth resumes, especially among the less skilled, is inadvertently reinforced by the major policy
tool used to lift the economy out of recession—interest rate cuts by the Federal
Reserve.
—Alan B. Krueger (2002)

employment prospects of the unskilled is
changes in hiring standards of high-quality job
providers that occur over the cycle. Changes
that occur during expansion and boom periods
mentioned by Okun include accepting younger
and less experienced workers or workers without diplomas and more intensive screening of
applicants. A forceful statement of this highpressure economy view is contained in Rebecca
Blank (2000).
A more recent view of the impact of technological adoption could have quite different
implications for movements in skill-based
relative unemployment over the cycle. For
example, Dale Mortensen and Christopher
Pissarides (1999) show that, in their equilibrium search and matching framework, the relationship between skill and unemployment
is convex in the presence of labor-market
policies such as unemployment compensation.
In this environment, skill-biased technology
shocks increase overall unemployment rates
with a disproportionate share of the unemployment falling on the unskilled. In his popular account of the matter, Krueger (2002)
ties cyclical investment in new technologies
to the conduct of monetary policy, thereby
linking relative educational unemployment to
monetary policy.
My answer to the title question emerges
from quantitative results designed to assess
the dynamic effect on relative educational
unemployment of a monetary policy surprise,
controlling for supply shocks and the introduction of new technical ideas. These findings
appear to resolve some of the tension between
alternative views on relative unemployment
dynamics in favor of the high-pressure economy hypothesis.

This paper examines the empirical relationship between relative educational unemployment rates and monetary policy. Such an
examination is warranted because policymakers’ attempts to understand the distributional
effects of monetary policy may be confounded
by vintages of the theoretical literature that offer
contrasting views of how skill-based relative
unemployment (with unemployment of the less
skilled in the numerator) might behave over the
business cycle.
A traditional view emphasizes characteristics
of labor markets that could induce countercyclical movements in skill-based relative unemployment. For example, Arthur Okun (1973)
argues that an important benefit of high levels of
aggregate economic activity is that opportunities for employment in the high-quality jobs
sector open up to the relatively unskilled. A
mechanism for the relative improvement of the

†
Discussants: Seth B. Carpenter, Federal Reserve
Board; Jonah B. Gelbach, University of Maryland; Bridget
Terry Long, Harvard University.

* Economics Department, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA 19081. I thank Seth Carpenter, James Hamilton,
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TABLE 1—RELATIVE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES: SUMMARY
STATISTICS 1992:1–2003:12
Education level

Mean

SD

Dropouts/College
High School/College
Some College/College
Dropouts/Some College
High School/Some College
Dropouts/High School

3.603
2.015
1.636
2.203
1.233
1.785

0.463
0.183
0.142
0.247
0.087
0.139

Note: SD ⫽ standard deviation.

I. Relative Unemployment: Some Facts

Monthly data on unemployment by educational attainment are available from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Data for four levels of educational attainment are reported for the civilian
population age 25 and older: less than highschool diploma (Dropouts), high-school diploma but no college (High School), some
college and/or associate’s degree (Some College), and bachelor’s degree or better (College).
I work with the seasonally adjusted form of the
data. Because of changes in educational attainment classifications and population coverage,
these data are available monthly only since
1992.
Relative unemployment rates are defined as
the ratio of the unemployment rate of the
unskilled group to the unemployment rate of
the skilled group. Given that there are four
levels of educational attainment, there are six
relative unemployment rates. Summary statistics on these ratios are given in Table 1 for the
full sample period: January 1992–December
2003.
Several facts emerge from Table 1. First, the
mean of each ratio is greater than 1. In any
group comparison, the relatively unskilled
group has a higher unemployment rate on average. Second, the larger is the educational differential (when clearly distinguishable), the
larger is the relative unemployment rate on average. Third, the ratio of the educational tails,
Dropouts/College, is the most volatile.
II. Insights from Theory

The literature overviewed in the Introduction
suggests that cyclical aggregate economic ac-
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tivity and technical adoption can have important
direct effects on relative educational unemployment rates. The hypothesis of skill-biased technological change is consistent with an increase
in relative unemployment as a result of an increase in the pace of technical adoption. The
high-pressure-economy hypothesis, however, is
consistent with a decrease in relative unemployment as the economy expands due possibly to
the expansion of opportunities available to the
relatively unskilled. Of course, there may be
other factors influencing relative unemployment
rates, but focusing on these two central factors,
one can summarize the relevant intuitive content of these competing hypotheses with the
following (linear) relation:
(1)

RUt ⫽ ␣0 ⫹ ␣1 At ⫹ ␣2 Ct ⫹ zt .

In equation (1), RU is the relative unemployment rate, A is the rate of technical adoption, C
represents the (business) cycle, and z is a portmanteau variable for other influences on relative
unemployment. Consistent with the intuitions
just summarized, the signs of the slope coefficients are ␣1 ⬎ 0 and ␣2 ⬍ 0.
A significant literature (including several
leading textbooks) allows real aggregate economic activity to be influenced by unanticipated
monetary policy in the short run and by supply
shocks. These factors are often thought to lead
the cycle. Thus,
(2)

Ct ⫽ ␤0 ⫹ ␤1 Pt ⫺ 1 ⫹ ␤2 St ⫺ 1 ⫹ et .

Here, P is a measure of monetary policy, S is a
measure of supply shocks, and e is a portmanteau variable for other influences on cyclical
economic activity. Of course, equation (2) is a
(linear) simplification of a broad class of models. A nontrivial part of the intuitive content of
those models, however, is encapsulated in the
signs of ␤1 and ␤2. For an interest-rate-based
measure of policy, an unanticipated relaxation
of policy should spur economic activity. That is,
␤1 ⬍ 0. An adverse supply shock (such as a
positive oil price shock) should slow economic
activity, ␤2 ⬍ 0.
A final intuition draws on the literature that
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revived interest in the Schumpeterian process
of creative destruction. Ricardo Caballero and
Mohamad Hammour (1994), for example,
present evidence that the rate of job creation is
pro-cyclical even in the presence of adjustment
costs. If experimentation with alternative business practices and new technologies is more
likely to accompany the creation of jobs, then it
may be reasonable to associate the job creation
process with the pace of technical adoption, as
Caballero and Hammour do. Therefore, technical adoption should be positively related to the
level of real aggregate economic activity. Additionally, new technical ideas created in the
past could be an important influence on the
current pace of technical adoption. Symbolically, this intuition is represented as
(3)

then policy will not have any effect on relative
unemployment. Although presented here in a
highly stylized context, the competition between hypotheses to command the sign of ␦1
proves to be quite useful for interpreting the
empirical results below.
Equation (4) has the structure of a distributed
lag model. Of course, its lag structure is quite
restrictive. One could easily imagine relaxing
that restriction by including more lags on the
policy, supply shock, and technical-ideas variables. Also, one might also want to include lags
of the dependent variable. In the empirical work
below, I in fact do this.1
III. Explaining Relative Unemployment:
Evidence from ADL Models

At ⫽ ␥0 ⫹ ␥1 Ct ⫹ ␥2 Tt ⫺ 1 ⫹ wt .

Here, T is a measure of the rate of creation of
new technical ideas, and w is a portmanteau
variable for other influences on the pace of
technical adoption. The intuitive content of this
class of models is consistent with ␥1 ⬎ 0. However, because the time it takes to sort through
new technical possibilities could slow or even
decrease the pace of actual adoption, ␥2  0.
In the next section, I estimate a number of
empirical models of relative educational unemployment. The challenge of interpreting the
estimated models is eased by the insights summarized in this section. To see this, note that
equations (1), (2), and (3) imply a relationship
between relative educational unemployment,
monetary policy, supply shocks, and technical
ideas of the form:

MAY 2005

A. Specification
Single-equation models conveniently provide
answers to two empirical questions of interest.
The first is: Do monetary policy surprises contain predictive power for relative unemployment controlling for supply shocks and
technical ideas? The second is: What is the
cumulative effect on relative unemployment of
a policy surprise?
The structure of these models is motivated by
the discussion in Section II. I consider autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models of the
following form:

冘P
12

(5)

RUt ⫽ 0 ⫹

i

i⫽1

冘T
12

(4) RUt ⫽ ␦0 ⫹ ␦1 Pt ⫺ 1 ⫹ ␦2 St ⫺ 1 ⫹ ␦3 Tt ⫺ 1 ⫹ t
where, for example, ␦1 ⫽ ␤1(␣1␥1 ⫹ ␣2), and 
is a linear combination of z, e, and w. Notice
that the sign of the reduced-form coefficient ␦1
is indeterminate. Given that ␤1 ⬍ 0, the sign of
␦1 depends on whether the negative influence on
relative unemployment implied by the highpressure-economy hypothesis outweighs the
positive impact of technical adoption on relative
unemployment. If the effects offset one another,

⫹

i
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冘  RU
12

i

t⫺i

⫹ t .

i⫽1

To see the connection between equations (4)
and (5), consider the following reparameterization of (5):

1
The relationship between monetary policy and unemployment differentials along other demographic lines (including race) is considered by Seth Carpenter and William
Rodgers (2004).
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RUt ⫽ 0 ⫹ *Pt ⫺ 1 ⫹ *St ⫺ 1 ⫹ *Tt ⫺ 1
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where, for example, * ⫽ ¥j12⫽ 1 j , 0 ⫽ 0, and
i ⫽ ⫺¥j12⫽ i ⫹ 1 j , i ⫽ 1, 2, ... , 11. Equation (6)
looks a lot like equation (4). However, it permits a more generous lag structure. In the case
of policy, for example, the reason for this is that
it is known that it takes time for the effects of a
monetary-policy initiative to work its way
through the economy.2 Any attempt to quantify
the impact of monetary policy should allow for
this.
B. Measurement
The measure of monetary policy that I employ is derived from the Federal Funds Futures
market data from the Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT) and the monthly average effective Federal Fund rate reported by the Federal Reserve.
The Federal Funds Futures market data are described in John Carlson et al. (1995). Federal
Funds Futures contracts began trading on the
CBOT in October 1988. The implied average
Federal Funds rate for, say, the coming month
can be easily derived from the settlement price
of a contract on any day of the preceding month.
I follow Glenn Rudebusch (1998) in constructing one-step-ahead forecast errors as rt ⫺
E(rt兩⍀t ⫺ 1) where r is the Federal Funds rate and
⍀ represents the set of information available to
agents at the given time period. The expectation, drawn from the futures market, is based on
the settlement price of a futures contract on the
last day of the preceding month. Negative forecast errors are associated with unanticipated

2
Two considerations influenced the choice of lag length.
The first was the desire to allow time for the effect of the
shock to be felt. The second was the desire to preserve
degrees of freedom.
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interest-rate reductions. Conversely, positive
forecast errors are associated with unanticipated
interest-rate increases. Because of the Federal
Reserve’s ability to control the Federal Funds
rate over the course of a month, I associate
monetary policy surprises with the one-stepahead forecast errors of the Federal Funds rate:
Pt ⬅ rt ⫺ E(rt兩⍀t ⫺ 1).
The measure of supply shocks, St, is James
Hamilton’s (2003) net oil price increase relative
to a three-year horizon. Hamilton argues that
upward oil price shocks have had a significant
negative impact on overall economic activity in
the United States in the post-World War II
period. To fully capture the oil price–U.S. GDP
relationship in the more recent period, Hamiltonian measures an oil price shock as the
amount by which oil prices in month t exceed
their peak value over the previous 36 months. If
they do not exceed their previous peak, then the
measure is taken to be zero.
The proxy for the rate at which new technical
ideas are introduced, Tt, is the growth rate of
real industrial research and development (R&D)
expenditure. These data are drawn from the
National Science Foundation (NSF) (2004). The
NSF reports these data annually by performing
sector and by source of funding. The raw annual
data were converted to a monthly frequency via
interpolation.
C. Estimation and Testing
Panel A of Table 2 reports the results of
chi-square tests for predictive power from equation (5).3 The null hypothesis for the chi-square
tests is that all of the slope coefficients are zero.
Focusing on the monetary-policy variable, the
null hypothesis is rejected for three of the six
measures of relative unemployment at conventional significance levels. Interestingly, when
considered jointly, temporary monetary surprises matter most for relative unemployment
rates involving those with a college degree or
better.

3

The models in Table 2 include a post-March 2001
dummy variable. The reason for this and estimates of its
coefficient are detailed in the next section.
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TABLE 2—ESTIMATION

AND

TESTING RESULTS

A. Predictive Power
Dependent variable

Policy

Supply Technical

Own
lags

Dropouts/College
High School/College
Some College/College
Dropouts/Some College
High School/Some College
Dropouts/High School

0.001
0.000
0.000
0.198
0.207
0.344

0.000
0.000
0.194
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Policy

Supply Technical

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

B. Cumulative Multiplier
Dependent variable
Dropouts/College

4.502* 0.004
0.093
(0.369) (0.196) (0.186)
High School/College
1.344* ⫺0.002 ⫺0.066*
(0.053) (0.019) (0.022)
Some College/College
1.011* ⫺0.006 ⫺0.177*
(0.023) (0.017) (0.019)
Dropouts/Some College
0.496* 0.016
0.289*
(0.193) (0.020) (0.012)
High School/Some College
0.873* 0.010
0.091*
(0.049) (0.020) (0.019)
Dropout/High School
⫺0.529* 0.000
0.139*
(0.044) (0.017) (0.023)

R 2
0.812
0.656
0.390
0.670
0.321
0.572

Notes: Each model includes a post-2001 dummy variable
(reported in Table 3). Panel A reports p values associated
with the null hypothesis that the coefficients are zero on lags
1–12 of the column variable. The test statistic is X2, df ⫽ 12.
Panel B reports cumulative multipliers, with standard errors
in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.

The parameter

⌰ ⫽ *

冒冉

冘
12

1⫺

i⫽1

i

冊

derived from equation (6) holds the key to the
answer of the second question: What is the
cumulative effect on relative unemployment
of a policy surprise? Often referred to as the
cumulative multiplier, ⌰ measures the total
effect on relative unemployment of a surprise
one unit increase in policy.4 Panel B of Table
2 reports estimates of the cumulative multiplier from equation (6). For five of six relative
educational unemployment rates, ⌰ is posi4
In my application, this would amount to an unanticipated 1-percentage-point increase in the Federal Funds rate.
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tive and statistically significant. For the sixth
measure it is negative and statistically significant. One interpretation of these findings is
grounded in the intuition developed following
equation (4).
As with ␦1 , it would seem (intuitively) that
⌰ ⬎ 0 is consistent with the high-pressureeconomy hypothesis, while ⌰ ⬍ 0 is consistent
with the hypothesis that technical adoption
hurts the relatively unskilled. If the two hypotheses offset one another, one would expect ⌰ ⫽
0 statistically. The results in Table 2 suggest
that the high-pressure-economy hypothesis dominates over the sample period.
IV. Robustness and Qualifications

The previous quantitative results provided
answers to two very specific questions. In this
section, the robustness of those results is considered. I test for parameter stability.
A. On the Interior
A common perception is that significant
structural change occurred in the U.S. macroeconomy during the boom of the late 1990s.
Structural change that redistributes employment
opportunities across educational groups may
have altered the relationship between relative
educational unemployment and its determinants
over the business cycle. If economy-wide structural change did occur in the late 1990s, then it
might be reasonable to think that it would induce shifts in the parameters of the empirical
model.
To investigate this possibility, I calculate a
sequence of Chow tests for each measure of
relative unemployment over the interior of the
sample (March 1996 –October 1999) and the
Andrews 5-percent critical value with 35percent trimming and 49 restrictions (Donald
W. K. Andrews, 1993). The null hypothesis of
no break in all of the coefficients in the ADL
models is rejected in only two of six cases:
Dropouts/College and Dropouts/High School.
The dates of these breaks are July 1999 and
September 1997, respectively. Thus, there is
some evidence that the dynamic multipliers
were unstable during the late 1990s, but it is not
overwhelming.
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TABLE 3—ESTIMATES OF POST-MARCH 2001 DUMMY
COEFFICIENT
Education level (dependent variable)

Coefficient

Dropouts/College

⫺0.573*
(0.106)
⫺0.245*
(0.038)
⫺0.329*
(0.061)
⫺0.165*
(0.039)
⫺0.041*
(0.015)
⫺0.079*
(0.027)

High School/College
Some College/College
Dropouts/Some College
High School/Some College
Dropouts/High School

Notes: Post-March 2001 dummy ⫽ 1 for t ⱖ 2001:3.
Estimates are for models in Table 2. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.

B. At the End
Each model estimated in Table 2 includes a
post-March 2001 dummy variable. This dummy,
which allows only the constant to shift, is included in order to assess how much weight
should be given to the possibility that structural
change impacted the unconditional mean of relative unemployment. Erica Groshen and Simon
Potter (2003), for example, present evidence
that a substantial reallocation of jobs across
industries occurred during the 2001 recession.
They argue that these reallocations are permanent in nature and that they, along with a change
in the use of temporary layoffs by employers,
are important sources of sluggish labor-market
performance in the recovery from the 2001 recession. If levels of educational attainment vary
across industries, then a change in the composition of jobs across industries could influence the average level of relative educational
unemployment.
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficient on
the post-March 2001 dummy in the models of
Table 2. In each model, the estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant.
Thus, the evidence suggests that, relatively
speaking, the incidence of unemployment
shifted (structurally) toward the better-educated
during the 2001 recession and its immediate
aftermath.
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V. Conclusions

Six measures of relative educational unemployment (with unemployment of the less
skilled in the numerator) are studied. For each
ratio involving those with a college degree or
better, the evidence from reduced-form dynamic models indicates that monetary-policy
surprises, measured as the one-step-ahead
forecast error of the Federal Funds rate derived from the Federal Funds Futures market,
forecast relative unemployment controlling
for supply shocks and new technical ideas.
For five of six ratios, the cumulative multiplier measuring the effect of a monetary surprise on relative unemployment is positive
and statistically significant. This evidence is
consistent with the view that the advantages
of tight labor markets outweigh the impact of
technical adoption on relative unemployment
over the business cycle.
The sensitivity of the results to structural
change is considered also. The results of parameter stability tests indicate that the incidence
of unemployment shifted toward the bettereducated during the 2001 recession and its immediate aftermath.
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